The Abolition of the Group Boycott Prohibition from New Zealand Competition Law by Ahdar, Rex
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2632029 
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 84 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Fri Aug 28 13:44:33 2015
/journals/journal/cclj/vol23pt1/part_1
The abolition of the group boycott
prohibition from New Zealand competition
law
Rex Tauati Ahdar*
New Zealand competition law’s per se prohibition upon group boycotts
(contracts, arrangements or understandings containing an exclusionary
provision), s 29 of the Commerce Act 1986, is destined for the scrap heap.
Proponents of its repeal contend that its infrequent use and attenuated reach
means its absence will not be missed, that hitherto s 29 has had a damaging
chilling effect upon commercial activity and that the apparent ability of other
provisions in the Act (especially the enhanced cartel offence) to fill the
vacuum will assuage any lingering concerns. The article finds these
justifications wanting and concludes that the preservation of the group
boycott ban is warranted.
Introduction
When the Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill 20111
(Cartel Bill) was quietly but remorselessly wending its way through the
legislative process, few noticed a pithy clause tucked away in the detail of the
bill. Clause 6, a seemingly innocuous little section, is entitled, ‘Section 29 is
repealed’ and the clause itself simply repeats those same four words. This
change, however, is far more significant than the modest wording and
inconspicuous placement of the repealing section would indicate.
Section 29 of the Commerce Act 1986 is New Zealand competition law’s
group boycott prohibition. Strictly speaking, s 29 prohibits ‘contracts,
arrangements or understandings that contain an exclusionary provision’. But
these arrangements are more commonly referred to by their American
appellation, group boycotts (also called ‘collective boycotts’ or ‘concerted
refusals to deal’). These pernicious forms of business conduct describe the
joint behaviour of competing firms to shut out and eliminate a rival.
Sometimes the boycotters will enlist the assistance of a common upstream
supplier to stem the flow of goods or services to the target firm. On other
occasions, the object of the boycotters’ attack is the upstream supplier itself or
a downstream customer or a common cluster of customers. Historically,
antitrust law viewed exclusionary anticompetitive conduct by rival firms as
sufficiently egregious to merit per se prohibition. A group boycott was seen as
worthy of condemnation without the usual extensive intensive inquiry into its
actual effects upon competition. This, at least, was the traditional wisdom.
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New Zealand has seen fit to abolish the ban on group boycotts entirely.
Antitrust law only has a half-dozen substantive offences and so the removal of
one of the principal prohibitions represents, on its face, a definite weakening
of the law.
This article examines the arguments given in support of the repeal of s 29
in light of the policy grounds for proscribing collective boycotts and the
history of boycott litigation. It is my contention that the case for abolition is
decidedly weak and that a group boycott prohibition still deserves its place in
NZ competition law
The per se ban on group boycotts
Group boycotts were subject to the per se ban in the United States from the
earliest:
‘This Court’, explained the Supreme Court in Northwest Wholesale Stationers in
1985, ‘has long held that certain concerted refusals to deal or group boycotts are so
likely to restrict competition without any offsetting efficiency gains that they should
be condemned as per se violations of s 1 of the Sherman Act’.2
In more recent times, beginning with Northwest Wholesale Stationers itself,
the courts have been chary of too quickly characterising any alleged concerted
refusal to deal as the sort of deleterious anticompetitive boycott situation that
merits condemnation pursuant to the per se rule: ‘Some care is . . . necessary
in defining the category of concerted refusals to deal that mandate per se
condemnation.’3 This is because ‘not every cooperative activity involving a
restraint or exclusion will share with the per se forbidden boycotts the
likelihood of predominantly anticompetitive consequences.’4 The
responsibility is upon the plaintiff to show that the conduct at issue is the sort
of blatantly anticompetitive exclusionary conduct that antitrust law’s per se
bans were designed to prohibit.5
In the not altogether helpful language of some commentators and judges:
it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show that conduct in question is the sort of
‘naked’ group boycott warranting the application of the per se rule and its attendant
harsh consequences.6
In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, the conduct — a wholesale purchasing
cooperative by stationery retailers — enabled the defendant firms to achieve
economies of scale and other cost savings. This then was not the kind of
conduct deserving of categorisation as ‘group boycotting’ and thus the court
held that the arrangement ought to be analysed under a rule-of-reason
analysis.7
2 Northwest Wholesale Stationers Inc v Pacific Stationery and Printing Co, 472 US 284
(1985) at 290, citing Klor’s Inc v Broadway-Hale Stores Inc (1959) 359 US 207 and five
subsequent Supreme Court cases.
3 Ibid, at 294.
4 Ibid, at 295.
5 Ibid, at 298.
6 See eg H Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, vol 13, Little Brown, Boston, 1999, pp 208, 211-12,
230-3; R Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, Basic Books, New York, 1978, Ch 17.
7 Northwest Wholesale Stationers 472 US 284 (1985) at 297.
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The hostility to group boycotts (properly characterised) can be explained on
two bases. A solid economic case can be made based upon the fact that the
particular firm shut out is likely be an innovative or cost-cutting rival of the
defendant boycotters. As Kirby J observed in South Sydney:
From an economic point of view, such exclusionary provisions [group boycotts]
diminish the potential of unilateral decisions by market players; impose on others
the aggregation of power which individual players may lack; and tend to be
introduced by powerful market entities exerting what is the antithesis of
competition. Such activities are frequently engaged in to prevent innovative market
entry and to permit powerful players to divide the market like the Popes of old
divided the world, for their own convenience and advantage.8
Consumers are deprived from enjoying the benefits the targeted firm’s output
might otherwise bring to the marketplace. The defendants can, in the
aftermath of a successful boycott scheme, maintain supra-competitive prices
and resume the ‘quiet life’.9 Secondly, such concerted behaviour against other
persons has been viewed as kind of ‘anti-social conduct, a type of business
bullying in which a competitive party without economic muscle is being
victimised’.10 Whatever the actual economic benefits the operation of the
targeted firm might have delivered to customers, the defendants’ ‘ganging-up’
conduct is unfair and abusive.11 The abhorrence of this bullying behaviour that
merits the imposition of a per se ban was described by the Full Federal Court
in Rural Press this way:
One reason for this strict approach to boycotts may be that they are seen as
objectionable on non-economic grounds as well as because of their potential to have
an adverse impact on competition. In particular, they are disliked because they can
be used to take away the freedom of firms and individuals to trade as they wish and
because they can be used the threaten the very existence, commercially or
professionally, of targets having little or no countervailing economic power. The
potential for boycotts to generate and exploit power is seen as inherently
objectionable, regardless of whether or not they are used to lessen competition.12
Group boycotts can take various forms. Following Haddon13 it is useful to
classify them into three types. There is, first, what I will call the ‘direct
horizontal boycott’. Here, the defendant boycotters refuse to deal with a rival.
8 News Ltd v South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2003) 215 CLR
563; 200 ALR 157; [2003] HCA 45; BC200304465 at [118].
9 Hovenkamp, above n 6, at 208, 230.
10 W Pengilley, ‘The Exclusionary Provisions of the New Zealand Commerce Act in Light of
United States Decisions and Australian Experience’ (1988) 3 Cant L R 357 at 365. See also
Kirby J in News Ltd v South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2003) 215
CLR 563; 200 ALR 157; [2003] HCA 45; BC200304465 at [118].
11 Group boycotting was described as ‘an insidious and subtle practice’ that should be ‘stamped
out’ by two Alliance Party MPs in the debates on the Commerce Amendment Bill 2001: see
K Campbell (2001) 597 NZ Parl Deb 7979 and J Wright (2001) 597 NZ Parl Deb 8738.
12 Rural Press Ltd v ACCC (2002) 118 FCR 236; 193 ALR 399; [2002] FCAFC 213;
BC200203866; at [94] quoting P Clarke and S Corones, Competition Law and Policy: Cases
and Materials, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1999, p 253.
13 J Haddon, ‘Three Exceptions to the Per Se Rule Against Boycotts’ (1985) 65 BU L Rev 165
at 169-72. See L Hampton, ‘Exclusionary Provisions: A Critique of the New Zealand
Reform’ (1993) 1 Trade Practices LJ 198 at 199, who introduced this helpful trichotomy to
NZ lawyers.
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The boycotters may, for example, be members of a trade association that
refuses to admit the plaintiff to their association. Secondly, the ‘indirect
horizontal boycott’ is where the boycotters invoke the assistance of a common
upstream supplier to both themselves and to the intended target. For example,
a group of vehicle tyre manufacturers might secure the upstream supplier of
rubber to cut off supplies of that material to a rival car tyre maker. Thirdly, a
‘direct vertical boycott’ is where the boycotters agree not to supply their
products or services to a downstream firm or not to acquire products from an
upstream firm. An example would be where tyre manufacturers agree not to
supply a particular discounting retail chain.
New Zealand’s group boycott ban is found in s 29(3) which states that:
No person shall enter into a contract, or arrangement, or arrive at an understanding,
that contains an exclusionary provision.
Such contracts require careful delineation, so s 29(1) provides the definition:
29. Contracts, arrangements, or understandings containing exclusionary
provisions prohibited
(1) Subject to subsection (1A), for the purposes of this Act, a provision of a
contract, arrangement, or understanding is an exclusionary provision if —
(a) it is a provision of a contract or arrangement entered into, or
understanding arrived at, between persons of whom any 2 or more
are in competition with each other; and
(b) it has the purpose of preventing, restricting, or limiting the supply of
goods or services to, or the acquisition of goods or services from, any
particular person or class of persons, either generally or in particular
circumstances or on particular conditions, by all or any of the parties
to the contract, arrangement, or understanding, or if a party is a body
corporate, by a body corporate that is interconnected with that party;
and
(c) the particular person or the class of persons to which the provision
relates is in competition with 1 or more of the parties to the contract,
arrangement or understanding in relation to the supply or acquisition
of those goods or services.
The weakening of the per se ban ... In two stages
Section 29 had been in operation only 4 years when it was amended. The
definition of a group boycott was revised to narrow its coverage to horizontal
boycotts (both direct and indirect). The target of the boycotters’ conduct had
to now be a competitor of the boycotters (or at least one of them). This was
achieved by the insertion of s 29(1)(c) (quoted above) by the Commerce
Amendment Act 1990.
Why did the government amend the section? The responsibility for the
change can be laid clearly at the feet of Dr Warren Pengilley, a leading
Australian antitrust lawyer and a prolific and influential writer upon all matters
antitrust. Pengilley argued at a competition law conference in 1987 in
The abolition of the group boycott prohibition 81
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 88 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Fri Aug 28 13:44:33 2015
/journals/journal/cclj/vol23pt1/part_1
Auckland, and in a series of articles,14 that Australian and NZ policymakers
had ‘mistranslated’ the American group boycott ban. He contended that, under
US law, the target of the boycotters had to be a direct rival of the defendants.
Despite the fact that no NZ cases had applied s 29 vertically, so to speak (to
proscribe conduct that thwarted the supply of goods or services to an upstream
supplier or a downstream customer or customers), the government changed
the law. The Department of Trade and Industry relied upon Pengilley’s
writing.15 Yet there had been no instances where the supposedly overly broad
reach of the per se ban had swept in and condemned conduct that, in
Pengilley’s view, it ought not to have done. This then was a change predicated
upon a hypothetical danger.
As it transpired, the Pengilley ‘overkill’ thesis was flawed. Dr Lindsay
Hampton demonstrated convincingly that American group boycott law had no
such requirement.16 The per se ban had been applied to vertical boycotts by
the American courts. One need only cite St Paul Fire and Marine Insurance
Co v Barry, where the Supreme Court said:
the boycotters and the ultimate target need not be in a competitive relationship with
each other. This Court has held unlawful concerted refusal to deal in cases where the
target is a customer of some or all of the conspirators who is being denied access to
a deserved good or service because of a refusal to accede to particular terms set by
some or all of the parties. See eg Paramount Famous Corp v United States, 282 US
30 (1930).17
Unfortunately, the die had been already cast. The reach of the per se ban had
been restricted upon an entirely erroneous basis.
The second amendment was equally, if not more, significant in terms of
eroding the effectiveness of the per se ban. The Ministry for Enterprise and
Commerce in 2001 received a number of submissions to yet another
amendment to the Commerce Act contending that s 29 was still too broad. The
thrust of these was, as the Select Committee explained, that the section ‘may
capture pro-competitive arrangements involving a vertically integrated firm
that also operates exclusive dealing agreements with downstream firms’.18
Some submissions sought the outright repeal of s 29.19 Abolition was one of
the four options the committee considered. In the end, it chose to add a
competition defence. Defendants would henceforth have the opportunity to
14 The Auckland conference paper was published as Pengilley, ‘Exclusionary Provisions of the
New Zealand Commerce Act’, above n 10. See also Pengilley, ‘Trade Associations and
Collective Boycotts in Australia and New Zealand: A Mistranslation of the Sherman Act
Down-Under?’ (1987) 32 Antitrust Bulletin 19; Pengilley, ‘Collective Boycotts under the
Australian Trade Practices Act: What our policymakers have failed to understand and what
the Dawson Committee should do about it’ (2002) 10 CCLJ 144; Pengilley, ‘Exclusionary
Provisions: The Past and the Future’ (2003) 26 UNSWLJ 238.
15 Department of Trade and Industry, Review of the Commerce Act 1986, August 1988.
16 Hampton, above n 13. .
17 483 US 531 (1978) at 543.
18 Commerce Committee Report on the Commerce Amendment Bill, 1 February 2001 p 9. See
also ANZCO Foods Waitara Ltd v AFFCO New Zealand Ltd [2006] 3 NZLR 351; (2005) 2
NZCCLR 759; 6 NZCPR 448 at [238] per William Young J.
19 Leading New Zealand law firm, Russell McVeagh, stated in its submission that the overkill
of s 29 (in terms of threatening benign market conduct) came to its attention on ‘almost a
weekly basis’, Commerce Committee Report, ibid, p 10.
82 (2015) 23 Competition & Consumer Law Journal
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 89 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Fri Aug 28 13:44:33 2015
/journals/journal/cclj/vol23pt1/part_1
prove that their agreement was not anticompetitive. Thus, the Commerce
Amendment Act 2001 added a new subsection (s 29(1A)), which states:
A provision of a contract, an arrangement, or an understanding that would, but for
this subsection, be an exclusionary provision under subsection (1) is not an
exclusionary provision if it is proved that the provision does not have the purpose,
or does not have or is not likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening
competition in a market.
Again, this amendment was predicated upon a hypothetical danger for, at least
in terms of the cases, no full substantive actions (aside from one interlocutory
action) had been brought against vertically-integrated firms that also operated
exclusive dealing with downstream firms.
Interestingly, both amendments to NZ’s boycott per se ban were
recommended for adoption in Australia by the Dawson Report.20 The Federal
Government, despite initially having supported the Dawson Committee’s
recommendation, decided not to implement either,21 save for a restricted
version of the competition defence (which caters for exclusionary provisions
in arrangements that are ‘for the purposes of a joint venture’ and that do not
have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening
competition).22
The case for abolition
Section 29 is redundant in the wake of the new s 30
With the passing of the new cartel prohibition — ostensibly broader in its
reach than the former provision (s 30) — the view of the policy-makers is that
s 29 will now be redundant. The Explanatory Note to the Cartel Bill states:
‘The conduct that [s 29] prohibits is now covered by the cartel prohibition in new
section 30 so far as it relates to restricting output.’ The Commerce Commission
agreed with the premise for repeal,23 as did the major commercial law firms, Bell
Gully and Buddle Findlay.24
The new s 30, much like the former s 30, is aimed at cartels. It now
criminalises certain ‘hard core’ cartel practices and, accordingly, more fully
defines just what counts as ‘cartel conduct’ for the purposes of the Act. The
revised s 30(1) states no person may enter into, or give effect to, a contract or
arrangement, or arrive at an understanding that contains a ‘cartel provision’.
Naturally, there is a detailed definition of this activity:
20 Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practice Act, January 2003, chaired by
Sir Daryl Dawson,. The New Zealand-style s 4D changes were recommendations 8.1 and 8.2
of the Report.
21 P Clarke and S Corones, Competition Law and Policy: Cases and Materials, 2nd ed, Oxford
University Press, Melbourne, 2005, p 289. The non-implementation was ‘fortunate’ in the
authors’ view, ibid.
22 Section 76C of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).
23 ‘Post repeal, s 27 and the new s30 will be sufficient to capture agreements containing
exclusionary provisions that would have otherwise also fallen within s 29’; Commerce
Commission, Supplementary Submission to the Commerce Select Committee, 22 November
2012, para 19
24 Bell Gully Submission to the Commerce Select Committee, 6 September 2012, para 39; B
Findlay, Submission to the Commerce Select Committee, 6 September 2012, para 20.
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30A. Meaning of cartel provision and related terms
(1) A cartel provision is a provision, contained in a contract, arrangement, or
understanding, that has the purpose, effect, or likely effect of 1 or more of the





(2) In this Act, price fixing means, as between the parties to a contract,
arrangement, or understanding, fixing, controlling, or maintaining, or
providing for the fixing, controlling, or maintaining of,—
(a) the price for goods or services that any 2 or more parties to the
contract, arrangement, or understanding supply or acquire in
competition with each other; or
(b) any discount, allowance, rebate, or credit in relation to goods or
services that any 2 or more parties to the contract, arrangement, or
understanding supply or acquire in competition with each other.
(3) In this Act, restricting output means preventing, restricting, or limiting, or
providing for the prevention, restriction, or limitation of,—
(a) the production or likely production by any party to a contract,
arrangement, or understanding of goods that any 2 or more of the
parties to the contract, arrangement, or understanding supply or
acquire in competition with each other; or
(b) the capacity or likely capacity of any party to a contract,
arrangement, or understanding to supply services that any 2 or more
parties to the contract, arrangement, or understanding supply or
acquire in competition with each other; or
(c) the supply or likely supply of goods or services that any 2 or more
parties to a contract, arrangement, or understanding supply in
competition with each other; or
(d) the acquisition or likely acquisition of goods or services that any 2 or
more parties to a contract, arrangement, or understanding acquire in
competition with each other.
(4) In this Act, market allocating means allocating between any 2 or more
parties to a contract, arrangement, or understanding, or providing for such an
allocation of, either or both of the following:
(a) the persons or classes of persons to or from whom the parties supply
or acquire goods or services in competition with each other:
(b) the geographic areas in which the parties supply or acquire goods or
services in competition with each other.
While much group boycotting activity is similar in its effect to a cartel, it does
not necessarily involve the fixing or controlling of prices, which is a necessary
element in one of the three forms of cartel violation, namely, s 30A(2). In a
group boycott there is simply an intention to rid the market of another rival by
refusing to trade with it or by choking off supplies to, or purchases from, it.
In the vertical group boycott situation there is likewise a desire to exclude a
84 (2015) 23 Competition & Consumer Law Journal
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person from a downstream (or upstream) market. The boycotters have no
immediate intention to fix prices. Nor do they undertake any tangible steps
toward that immediate end.
It might, none the less, be said that there is an intention on the part of the
boycotters to limit output, the second form of cartel conduct set out in s
30A(3). This is because a focused desire to eliminate a rival necessarily
encompasses a desire to limit that firm’s output. So most, if not all, boycotting
behaviour would seem to constitute a contract, arrangement or understanding
that has the purpose of restricting the supply of goods to the target or the
acquisition of goods from the boycotting parties to the targeted person or
group of persons.
Turning to the third kind of cartel conduct, market allocation (s 30A(4)),
most boycotting behaviour may equally well fit within that category as well.
The boycotters have agreed upon the persons or classes of persons to or from
whom they will supply or purchase goods or services.
There is no doubt that s 27 embraces group boycotting conduct. The general
inevitably encompasses the particular. The prohibition upon anticompetitive
conduct generally naturally includes particular instances of anticompetitive
behaviour. But s 27 is a rule of reason not a per se provision. The onus is upon
the plaintiff to positively demonstrate that this instance of exclusionary
behaviour has the purpose, effect of likely effect of substantially lessening
competition in a market. This is never a straightforward exercise.25 As William
Young J in ANZCO Foods Waitara Ltd v AFFCO New Zealand Ltd observed
when speaking of s 28 (identical to the s 27 proscription but simply extended
to covenants):
In this context, it is important to recognise that assessment of anti-competitive effect
is necessarily uncertain. Market definition is a fertile source of disagreement.
Assessment of ‘effect’ and ‘likely effect’ under s 28 involves counter-factual
analysis, ie, a hypothetical question comparing competition as events have panned
out with the level of competition which would have obtained if the covenant had not
been insisted on. A high level of evaluation is required and there is necessarily scope
for differing opinions ... I agree that the uncertainties, expense and imperfections in
trying to assess anti-competitive effect are very significant.26
The beauty of a per se rule is that once the conduct has been proven to have
occurred, the practice is illegal forthwith without the arduous task of proving
deleterious effects upon competition. ‘The trump card of antitrust law’27 (the
per se rule) has been replaced with a wet bus ticket.
There is one notable instance where conduct that squarely fell within the
s 29 prohibition was, instead (‘surprisingly’),28 challenged successfully under
s 27.
25 In the American context it has been noted that: ‘Rule of reason cases are far more difficult
to win than are per se cases and are thus much less frequently even initiated’; C P Rogers
III, ‘The Incredible Shrinking Antitrust Law and the Antitrust Gap’ (2013) 52 U Louisville
L Rev 67 at 67.
26 [2006] 3 NZLR 351; (2005) 2 NZCCLR 759; 6 NZCPR 448 at [150].
27 United States v Realty Multi-List Inc, 629 F 2d 1351 (1980) at 1362-3 per Goldberg J;
Professor Pengilley introduced this memorable phrase (and many others) to Australasian
lawyers: See eg Pengilley, above n 10, at 371.
28 L Hampton with P Scott, Guide to Competition Law, LexisNexis NZ, Wellington, 2013, p
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In Commerce Commission v Opthalmological Society of New Zealand
Inc,29 the commission won its action against the sole Southland eye surgeon,
Dr Rogers, a colleague based in Christchurch, Dr Elder (who did monthly
outpatient visits to Southland) and the national association. Together, and led
by Rogers, they had entered into an arrangement to exclude two Australian
opthalmologists from operating in Southland. The Opthalmological Society
decided resident surgeons would not provide ‘general oversight’ (supervision)
of the ‘itinerant’ Australian surgeons, thus effectively preventing them from
operating in New Zealand. These experienced and well-regarded overseas
surgeons would have cleared up a large backlog of cataract patients and done
so at a significantly lower cost, with consequent savings to Southland Health
and thus the NZ taxpayer. The fee for the procedure quoted by Rogers was
originally $1100 but, in the wake of the imminent entry of the overseas
surgeons (prepared to do the procedure for $600), Rogers’ fee promptly
lowered to $675.30 Putting aside the considerable cost savings that
competition generated, the societal benefits in terms of the alleviation to the
long-suffering vision-impaired patients of Southland cannot be discounted.
Gendall J summarised:
In general terms, what occurred was concerted action by members of a profession,
and its professional body, to assist a colleague avoid legitimate competition to
protect what he, and his profession, regarded as his exclusive domain. It was
lamentable and the media release of the NZMC [Medical Council] aptly states the
position that the arrangement of the defendants’, and action of some of them, was:
‘an attempt by professional rivals to restrict the legitimate safe practice of medicine
by an appropriately qualified doctor’.31
In the subsequent sentencing hearing, Gendall J noted the ‘flow-on effects’ to
other markets, and even other professions.32 The action of the national society
sent a signal to other hospitals that NZ medical professionals would — if the
errant opthalmologists were any guide — likely resist such efforts to recruit
professionals from overseas to ease waiting lists and diminish consultants’
fees. Now, the commission still succeeded in its case. But the length of the
court hearing (22 days) and the extensive evidence33 demonstrates what hard
work it was to win what would have been a straightforward victory under s 29.
Being a s 27 case, the court needed to undertake a market definition
analysis. This inquiry, which can be complex, is, by contrast, usually otiose or
126; M Sumpter, New Zealand Competition Law and Policy, CCH NZ, Auckland, 2010, p
241 agrees: ‘the facts of the Opthalmological case fit snugly with the s 29 cause of action’;
P Scott, ‘Competition Law and Policy: Can a Generalist Law be an Effective Regulator?’ in
Recalibrating Behaviour: Smarter Regulation in a Global World , S Frankel and D Ryder
(Eds), LexisNexis NZ, Wellington, 2013, Ch 5, p 148, described Opthalmological Society as
‘an open and shut section 29 case’.
29 (2004) 10 TCLR 994.
30 Ibid, at [201].
31 Ibid, at [209].
32 Commerce Commission v Opthalmological Society of New Zealand Inc [Penalty] [2004] 3
NZLR 689 at [11].
33 As Gendall J (2004) 10 TCLR 994 at 997 recounts, the trial yielded ‘almost 400pp of direct
evidence 825 pp of notes of cross and re-examination and 271 pp of submissions’.
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perfunctory in s 29 cases.34 In group boycott proceedings, the boycotters (or,
to be precise, some of them, viz, ‘any 2 or more parties to the contract’)
simply have to be ‘in competition with each other’ — a conclusion that is
readily inferred from the fact the defendants took the trouble to enter into an
arrangement to stymie another firm.
Illustrations where s 29 worked much more efficiently to condemn
anti-competitive conduct than s 27 would have done are not difficult to cite.
In Commerce Commission v Wrightson NMA Ltd,35 five real estate agents in
Picton and Blenheim agreed to prevent a new entrant, the Property Centre,
from advertising alongside them in the local newspaper, the Marlborough
Express (the Express). The Express published a property lift-out each week in
which all the real estate firms advertised. The Property Centre sought to
advertise in the Express in two ways that upset the incumbents. It advertised
its commission and it set a commission rate lower that its rivals. One estate
agent acted as the instigator to secure the others to threaten to withdraw their
advertising unless the Property Centre advertisement was excluded from the
lift-out section. The latter would still be able to advertise in the main body of
the newspaper. Following a commission investigation, the defendant real
estate agents admitted liability under s 29 and the High Court imposed
pecuniary penalties upon them.36
If this case had been brought under s 27, the commission’s job would, I
suggest, have been much tougher. It would have had to show that the
exclusion of one real estate company’s advertisement from a section of the
newspaper (not the entire paper) had the purpose or effect or likely effect of
substantially lessening competition in the relevant market. Does it represent a
‘substantial’ reduction in competition between real estate firms if one real
estate company is not featured in the specially-designed section in the town
newspaper? Was there another newspaper for it to advertise in? And just what
was the market? Was it newspaper advertising or did it include radio and ‘junk
mail’ advertising?
I have been speaking about s 27. But the argument, it will be recalled, is that
not that s 27 but rather the revamped s 30 will adequately address the same
mischief that s 29 addressed. Prima facie it appears that, indeed, the output
limitation and market division definitions of cartel will capture most, if not all,
boycotting activity.
Section 29 is too broad and chills or captures benign or even
pro-competitive conduct
The Select Committee report on the 2001 Amendment expressed this concern:
The wider issue is that section 29 may capture pro-competitive arrangements
involving a vertically integrated firm that also operates excusive dealing
34 In News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd (1996) 64 FCR 410; 139 ALR 193 at
330; 21 ACSR 635; BC9604667, the Full Federal Court said that market definition analysis
was not required in group boycott lawsuits; Hampton with Scott, above n 28, at 126; See
similarly Sumpter, above n 28, at 246-7.
35 (1995) 5 NZBLC 103,668; 6 TCLR 279.
36 The instigator of the boycott paid a penalty of $20,000 and the other four defendants
$10,000 each: Ibid, at 103,674.
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arrangements with other downstream firms. For example, a manufacturer might
agree to sell its products through one or more, but not all potential retailers of the
products. If the manufacturer also sells direct to the public through, say, the internet
then it appears that the three conditions listed [in s 29(1)] will have been met. Such
an arrangement is most unlikely to be anti-competitive because the distributor’s
market power will usually be limited by inter-brand competition.37
One of the very few s 29 cases to reach court echoed this. Gault J in Tui Foods
commented that the section ‘appears to extend to arrangements that may well
enhance competition and involve reasonable competitive activity’.38 He gave
as an example the practice of graduated discounts for volume trading that were
designed to capture business from competitors.39 I shall return to the Tui case
and the concerns raised therein in the next section.
It is seldom utilised and thus its repeal is of little moment
The dearth of cases where s 29 has been pleaded as a cause of action suggest
to some that the section’s abolition would mean little is lost. It is true there has
been a paucity of s 29 cases. The number of full substantive hearings where
a s 29 claim has been pursued and where the court has decided the issue is a
mere two cases.40 Add to that there have been a handful of interlocutory
injunction actions (four),41 striking-out applications (four)42 and agreed
penalty decisions (two),43 and the total over a near three decade period is,
indeed, meagre.
Turning to authorisations, under s 58(5) group boycotts may be authorised.
The test is found in s 61(7): authorisation is granted if the applicants satisfy
the commission that their arrangement will result in public benefits that
outweigh the detriments engendered by the lessening of competition. There
have, again, been few authorisation applications by parties to an exclusionary
arrangement. Most have been declined on the basis the commission lacked
jurisdiction to entertain the application.44 The declining of jurisdiction is a
37 Commerce Committee Report on the Commerce Amendment Bill, 1 February 2001, p 9.
38 Tui Foods Ltd v New Zealand Milk Corp Ltd (1993) 4 NZBLC 103,335 at 103,340; 5 TCLR
406.
39 Ibid.
40 Auckland Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars (Auckland) Airport Ltd [1987] 2 NZLR
647; Todd Pohokura Ltd v Shell Exploration NZ Ltd [2010] NZHC 1134; (1988) 2 TCLR
605.
41 Direct Holdings Ltd v Feltex Furnishings of New Zealand Ltd[1986] 6 NZAR 245; Chatham
Is Fisherman’s Co-op Co Ltd v Chatham Is Packaging Co Ltd (1988) 2 TCLR 605; Tui
Foods Ltd v New Zealand Milk Corp Ltd (1993) 4 NZBLC 103 at 335; Clee v
Attorney-General, Unreported, Auckland HC, CIV-2010-404-007101, 12 November 2010,
Ellis J.
42 Picture Perfect Ltd v Camera House Ltd [1996] 1 NZLR 310; Clear Communications Ltd v
Sky Network Television Ltd [1997] BCL 917; Transpower New Zealand Ltd v Todd Energy
Ltd[2007] NZCA 30; New Zealand Steel Ltd v National Distribution Union Inc Unreported,
Auckland HC, CIV-2009-404-6090, Potter J.
43 Commerce Commission v New Zealand Motor Body Builders Assoc Inc Unreported,
Auckland HC, CP 774/93, 1 December 1995, Thorp J; Commerce Commission v Wrightson
NMA Ltd (1995) 5 NZBLC 103,668; 6 TCLR 279.
44 Weddel Crown Corp Ltd [1987] NZComComm 20; (1987) 1 NZBLC (Com) 104,201;
Transpower New Zealand Ltd [1999] NZComComm 23; Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd
[2012] NZComComm 7; [2012] NZCC 7; Electricity Market Company Ltd [1996]
NZComComm 16 at [203]-[211].
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determination that the practice or conduct at issue presents ‘no real risk’ that
s 29 applies, because there is ‘no reasonable possibility’ that it involves an
exclusionary provision under s 29(1).45 Where jurisdiction was established
(because the practice would or ‘might’ constitute an arrangement containing
an exclusionary provision) it appears that only two applications have been
refused authorisation.46 By contrast, it appears six applications have passed
muster and been granted the immunisation the parties sought.47
The lack of litigation (and paucity of authorisation applications) does not
necessarily mean the group boycott ban is, or has not been, effective. There are
an unknowable number of boycott practices that but for s 29 may have been
implemented.
The section’s coverage has already been greatly restricted and
thus its repeal is now warranted
As the previous section of this article outlined, the effectiveness of the per se
ban in s 29 has been significant attenuated by the two amendments (in 1990
and 2001). Commentators pronounce that s 29 ‘has been legislated out of
existence [and has become] a dead letter’,48 there ‘is a fair argument that s 29
should be repealed’49 and even the hope that ‘the Commerce Act’s most
useless and enigmatic provision, s 29, will soon bite the dust’.50 But the fact
that it is no longer as effective as it ought to be does not mean that it is
deserving of the coup de grace. As I shall argue later, the section still has work
to do. Indeed, I would argue that both of its amendments were ill judged and
ought to be reversed. This is not likely to happen, but the case for its complete
abolition is not merited. The patient is ailing, but is not deserving of being
euthanised.
The case for its retention
Section 29 does not chill benign or pro-competitive conduct
An oft-heard complaint against antitrust law is that it chills productive
business activity. This is a frequent plea in respect of monopolisation.51 But
45 Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd [2012] NZComComm 7; [2012] NZCC 7 at [110].
46 Speedway Control Board of New Zealand (Inc) [1989] NZComComm 20; (1990) 2 NZBLC
(Com) 104,521; South Pacific Tyres (NZ) Ltd [1990] NZComComm 6. I have said ‘appears’
here, because the large number of authorisation and clearance applications, 820, as of
December 2014 on NZLII at <http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZComComm/> cannot be
electronically searched to discover how many involved attempts to gain immunisation for s
29 conduct. The first Commerce Commission decision is No 171, a merger determination;
New Zealand Equities Ltd/UEB Industries Ltd [1986] NZComComm 20.
47 See Weddel Crown Corp Ltd [1987] NZComComm 20; (1987) 1 NZBLC (Com) 104,201 at
[49]-[50]; New Zealand Stock Exchange [1989] NZ Com Comm; Insurance Council of New
Zealand (Inc) [Nuclear Risks Exclusion] [1990] NZComComm 3; Fonterra Co-operative
Group Ltd [2012] NZComComm 7; [2012] NZCC 7; Electricity Market Company Ltd
[1996] NZComComm 16 at [203]-[211]; Sydney Futures Exchange Ltd [1993]
NZComComm 16.
48 Scott, above n 28, at 146 and 148.
49 Sumpter, above n 28, at 239.
50 M Sumpter, ‘Competition Law’ [2012] NZ L Rev 113 at 140.
51 See, eg, Ahdar, ‘Escaping New Zealand’s Monopolisation Quagmire’ (2006) 34 ABLR 260
at 262-4.
The abolition of the group boycott prohibition 89
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 96 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Fri Aug 28 13:44:33 2015
/journals/journal/cclj/vol23pt1/part_1
the same charge is leveled against group boycotts law. Dr Pengilley in his
writings on the subject paraded a litany of horribles where the per se ban on
collective boycotts was, in his view, too heavy handed.52 But his examples of
overkill are not, in my opinion, convincing.
In Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association (Inc)53 the Federal
Court found a violation of the group boycott prohibition when the WACA and
the cricket clubs in Perth agreed not to allow Kim Hughes, a former Australian
captain, to play for any club in that city. Hughes had led an unofficial ‘rebel’
Australian side to South Africa during the apartheid era. The WACA’s ban also
meant that Hughes could not play for the state, nor for Australia. Pengilley
charges that this is an instance of ‘overkill’ since clearly Hughes was not in
competition with the clubs or the WACA. Nor did his absence (and that of
three other rebel players also banned) substantially diminish competition in
the market where clubs compete for the services of the best players in Western
Australia.54 While Pengilley is indubitably right that Hughes was not in
competition with the defendants (and thus, in New Zealand, would fail to
satisfy s 29(1)(c) — a requirement absent in the Australian boycott section)
and a substantial hindering of competition was similarly missing, the decision
of Toohey J in Hughes amply fulfills a non-economic goal of boycott law: to
prevent business bullying. Pengilley also proffered these examples of overkill:
(subject to the possibility of public benefit authorization ... ) drug companies,
perhaps for genuine safety reasons, cannot agree not to supply certain products to
supermarkets; hoteliers cannot agree not to supply liquor to drunks (who presumably
constitute ‘a class of persons’); trade associations cannot agree to provide services
to certain classes of outlets ... it would be illegal for credit card companies to agree
not to provide services to adult entertainment outlets.55
But, as he concedes at the outset, these instances are all capable of being
authorised by the Commerce Commission if need be, and, undoubtedly would
be authorised (unless the reason advanced was bogus).
More importantly, a court or the commission would undertake an initial
‘quick look’ characterisation analysis56 to decide if these situations bore any
resemblance to the sort of egregious anticompetitive conduct the per se ban
was meant to address. The per se rule may be ‘the antitrust trump card’, but
the same judge immediately added that:
in light of the potency of the per se rule . . . the invocation of this
conversation-stopper must be limited to those situations which fairly fall within its
rationale.57
52 See, eg, Pengilley, above n 14, at 1033-5.
53 (1986) 19 FCR 10; 69 ALR 660.
54 There were approximately 150 A-Grade cricketers who were talented enough to play for
club, state and test teams: ibid, at 696.
55 Pengilley, above n 14, at 1035.
56 See Hovenkamp, above n 6, at 227.
57 Realty Multi-List, 629 F 2d 1351 (1980) at 1363, per Goldberg J.
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Similarly, in a pithy fashion, the Supreme Court in Northwest Wholesale
Stationers cautioned ‘It does not denigrate the per se approach to suggest care
in application’.58
With a mature and sensible reading of the section, it is, I suggest, virtually
certain no court would find the examples above ought to characterised as
boycotts — despite the facts literally falling within the wording of the section.
Just as they have undertaken the preliminary characterisation exercise with
situations of alleged price-fixing,59 courts are adept enough to separate the
pernicious anticompetitive chaff from the neutral or procompetitive wheat.
In New Zealand, a case frequently cited as evidence of the malign shadow
cast by s 29 over healthy business conduct is Tui Foods.60 New Zealand Milk
Corp and Tui Foods were milk processors. Before deregulation, the former
had the upper half of the North Island to itself and the latter, the lower half of
the North Island. Following deregulation, Tui offered a new contract to all
route trade customers (ie, dairies, convenience stores and so on) in the greater
Wellington area. These contracts provided a 3% rebate on all Tui products if
the retailer stocked Tui products only. The contracts were of 6 months
duration. NZMC sought an interim injunction to prevent Tui’s new
agreements coming into force. The High Court granted it, holding that NZMC
had made out an arguable case that the Tui contracts breached s 29. On appeal,
the Court of Appeal affirmed. The appellant, Tui, conceded that ss 29(1)(a) and
29(1)(c) were satisfied. The focus of the argument was whether, pursuant to
the remaining limb, s 29(1)(b), the purpose of the exclusivity conditions in the
franchise contracts was to stem the acquisition of products from potential
competitors of the franchisor (Tui), namely, NZMC. Cooke P held that this
was the purpose. Gault J expressed some unease:
I admit to difficulty in seeing just what the section [s 29] is intended to target. In its
terms where traders happen to compete are involved, it appears to extend to
arrangements that may well enhance competition and involve reasonable
competitive activity. I envisage for example graduated discounts for volume trading
that clearly are intended to capture business from competitors (although falling short
of predatory pricing). The difficulty I have in distinguishing between what
reasonable competitive activity that presumably is intended not to be prohibited and
activities that are targeted by the section leaves me in some doubt as to the
appropriate approach to the substantive issue that arises in this case.61
In the end he agreed with the rest of the Court of Appeal that the purpose of
the condition was anticompetitive in terms of s 29(1)(b) and that, overall, there
was a strong arguable case for infringement of the section. The availability of
58 477 US 284 at 298 (1985).
59 For NZ cases where careful characterisation was engaged in by the court prior to the
application of the per se ban on price fixing to the facts, see, eg, Commerce Commission v
Caltex New Zealand Ltd [1988] 2 NZLR 78 at 82-5 and Commerce Commission v Siemens
AG (2010) 13 TCLR 40; [2011] NZCCLR 10 at [236]-[258]. On the need for
characterisation see, eg, R Ahdar, ‘The Competitive Effects and Legality of Maximum Price
Fixing’ (1989) 15 NZULR 271 at 289-92; K Hylton, Antitrust Law, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 2003, Ch 6.
60 (1993) 4 NZBLC 103,335.
61 Ibid, at 103,340.
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the rebate here was conditioned on not acquiring products from any other
source, rather than say the quantities product ordered.62
Gault J’s discomfort at the broad scope of s 29 and his wariness in too
readily finding a violation — lest the section may catch too many innocuous
or pro-competitive business practices — is understandable in the
circumstances. For the facts of Tui Foods ought never to have been
characterised as an instance of group boycotting conduct in the first place.
This was really a case of exclusive dealing (and hence deserving of rule of
reason evaluation under s 27), not a group boycott.
Recall that both plaintiff and defendant had agreed that s 29(1)(a) was
satisfied. This limb requires there to be a contract, arrangement or
understanding between persons of who any two or more are in competition
with each other. But it is hard to find two parties to the same contract in Tui
Foods that were ever in competition with each other. What we had in Tui
Foods were myriad vertical arrangements between Tui Foods and a large
number of particular shops, such as the second respondent, Clymas, an Upper
Hutt shop. The shops never entered into a horizontal understanding with each
other.
This is similar to Auckland Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars
(Auckland Airport) Ltd where the High Court found no breach of s 29.63 This
was the first substantive case under the Act and one of the very few where s
29 was pleaded and a ruling given. In that case, the ARA, who owned and
managed Auckland International Airport, had granted franchises to two rental
car firms, Hertz and Avis. The plaintiff, Budget, who also sought to operate at
the airport, unsuccessfully argued that it had been wrongfully excluded in
violation of s 29. Barker J held here there were two vertical arrangements
(ARA and Hertz, alongside ARA and Avis) not one trilateral agreement
involving the ARA, Hertz and Avis.64 The airport and the rental car companies
were obviously not in competition with each other. Furthermore, there was no
evidence that Hertz and Avis had ever entered into an understanding. Indeed,
as Barker J noted, there was no need for them to enter into an arrangement
because each knew there were only two licences to be granted at the airport.65
The terms of the tender for licences had been clearly stated to be on a ‘one of
two’ basis. The ARA had bound itself to a collateral undertaking to each rental
company not to grant more than two rental car concessions while each licence
remained in force. Thus, ‘the two independent collateral contracts made any
“understanding” between the two competitors unnecessary’.66There may be
situations where the choice between a series of vertical arrangements versus
one larger multi-party arrangement is not so clear-cut. In News Ltd v
Australian Rugby Football League Ltd, the Federal Court had held the ARL
and rugby league clubs had not breached the Australian equivalent of s 29.67
The ARL had secured the agreement of 20 rugby league clubs to loyalty
62 Ibid.
63 [1987] 2 NZLR 647 at 660-5.
64 Ibid, at 664: ‘It is fairly plain that there were two lots of two-way arrangements, not one lot
of three-way arrangements.’
65 Ibid, at 664.
66 Ibid.
67 (1996) 58 FCR 447; 135 ALR 33; BC9600273.
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agreements whereby the clubs would participate in the traditional ARL
competition and not the newly-founded Super League run by News Ltd.
Burchett J held that the Australian equivalent of s 29(1)(a) had not been
satisfied.
They [the Loyalty Agreements] are ‘vertical’ arrangements, and they do not
contemplate or require ‘horizontal’ arrangements between the clubs.68
On appeal, the Full Federal Court disagreed, finding instead there had been a
group boycott entered into.69 The evidence made it clear the ARL and the
clubs were all part of a broader understanding whereby each club not just
hoped, but rather fully expected, other clubs to enter into the loyalty pact. This
was not 20 separate vertical agreements (between the ARL and Manly, the
ARL and St George, etc) but a multi-party arrangement with the ARL at the
top as ringleader, so to speak, and the 20 competing clubs below all giving
their tacit approval to a common undertaking.70 The entire transaction was an
intertwined composite one pursuant incorporating a horizontal consensus.
The Select Committee seems to have had the Tui Foods case in mind when
it alluded to pro-competitive practices that might be wrongfully swept into the
s 29 ban. To reiterate, it claimed:
The wider issue is that section 29 may capture pro-competitive arrangements
involving a vertically integrated firm that also operates excusive dealing
arrangements with other downstream firms. For example, a manufacturer might
agree to sell its products through one or more, but not all potential retailers of the
products. If the manufacturer also sells direct to the public through, say, the internet
then it appears that the three conditions listed [in s 29(1)] will have been met. Such
an arrangement is most unlikely to be anti-competitive because the distributor’s
market power will usually be limited by inter-brand competition.71
First, to assert that it is ‘most unlikely’ that this arrangement would be
anticompetitive is pure speculation, and ill-founded speculation at that. There
is no guarantee the defendant’s market power would be limited by inter-brand
competition and the experience of excusive dealing in New Zealand — borne
out by the Fisher and Paykel litigation72 — indicates that exclusive dealing is
frequently the vehicle for the exploitation of market power by dominant
incumbent firms given the lack of competitors in New Zealand’s typically
highly-concentrated markets.
Second, and more tellingly, it is doubtful the scenario posited would be
caught by s 29 for the reasons alluded to above. The retailers tied to the
defendant pursuant to exclusive dealing agreements would be contracted by
virtue of a series of vertical agreements not a composite trilateral agreement
involving a horizontal understanding between the retailers inter se.
68 Ibid, at ALR 97. See also ibid, at 109
69 News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd (1996) 64 FCR 410; 139 ALR 193; 21
ACSR 635; BC9604667.
70 Ibid, at ALR 346.
71 Commerce Committee Report on the Commerce Amendment Bill, 1 February 2001, p 9.
72 Fisher & Paykel Ltd v Commerce Commission [1990] 2 NZLR 731. See Ahdar, ‘Exclusive
Dealing and the Fisher & PaykelSaga’ (1992) 15 NZULR 1.
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The replacement for s 29 may, ironically, be even more chilling and
intrusive than s 29
Ironically, the revised s 30, which proponents of repeal place their faith in,
may work too well. Section 30(1)’s broad ‘cartel provision’ definition would
appear to extend to boycotts that s 29 does not catch.
First, the restricting output and market allocation definitions of cartel
conduct are wide enough to capture conduct in the nature of a direct vertical
boycott. The parties to a standard quota or output cartel may agree to restrict
the supply of goods or services. Section 30A(3) does not require the victims
of the non-supply to be competitors of the boycotters. But, as noted above,
s 29(1)(c) was introduced in 1990 to require that very thing. Market division
refers to allocation between the parties of the persons or classes of person to
whom the parties will supply or acquire goods or services. Again, the
collective boycott of a class of customers would seem to fit within this section.
But this behaviour would not be a group boycott under s 29.
Second, the definition of cartel in s 30A(1) refers to provisions of contracts,
arrangements or understandings that have not just the ‘purpose’, but also the
‘effect or likely effect’ of fixing prices, restricting output or dividing up the
market. Section 29(1), by contrast, only captures exclusionary conduct that
has the ‘purpose’ of restricting access to or from rival firms. The legislative
history of the Australian equivalent of New Zealand’s s 29 — s 4D of the
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), now, the Competition and Consumer Act 2010
(Cth) — clearly shows that the Parliament in Canberra deliberately omitted an
effects test from the group boycott ban. This, despite the Swanson Report
recommendation for the per se offence to include arrangements whose
purpose, effect or likely effect, was restricting the persons or classes of person
who might be dealt with.73
So, to revisit the earlier illustration, an arrangement between the tyre
manufacturers not to supply tyres to a chain of retailers of dubious credit
worthiness would not be a group boycott under s 29. The tyre retailers are not
rivals of the boycotting tyre makers and thus s 29(1)(c) is not satisfied. But
this vertical boycott might be an instance of a cartel of the restricting output
or market division kind. The arrangement has the effect of restricting the
supply of tyres that two or more of the parties to the arrangement supply in
competition with each other: s 30A(3)(c). This same vertical boycott may
represent an allocation between the rival tyre makers of the persons or classes
of person to the parties supply tyres in competition with each other: s
30A(4)(a).
The potential overkill might be averted in two ways: by fitting the conduct
at issue within the new exemption for ‘collaborative activity’ in the Act in s
31 or by seeking a clearance under the new mechanism provided in s 65A.74
But securing an exemption will not be straightforward.
73 Full FC in Rural Press (2002) 118 FCR 236; 193 ALR 399; [2002] FCAFC 213;
BC200203866 at [92] and [104]; Rural Press (2003) 216 CLR 53; 203 ALR 217; [2003]
HCA 75; BC200307578 at [74]-[75] per Gummow J et al.
74 See further Commerce Commission, Competitor Collaboration Guidelines: Revised Draft,
(CCG), August 2014 at <http://www.comcom.govt.nz/business-competition/guidelines-
2/competitor-collaboration-guidelines/> (accessed 5 August 2015).
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The collaborative activity exemption has several new hoops for the parties
to jump through:
31. Exemption for collaborative activity
(1) Nothing in section 30 applies to a person who enters into a contract or
arrangement, or arrives at an understanding, that contains a cartel provision,
or who gives effect to a cartel provision in a contract, arrangement, or
understanding, if, at the time of entering into the contract, arrangement, or
understanding or giving effect to the cartel provision,—
(a) the person and 1 or more parties to the contract, arrangement, or
understanding are involved in a collaborative activity; and
(b) the cartel provision is reasonably necessary for the purpose of the
collaborative activity.
(2) In this Act, collaborative activity means an enterprise, venture, or other
activity, in trade, that—
(a) is carried on in co-operation by 2 or more persons; and
(b) is not carried on for the dominant purpose of lessening
(3) The purpose referred to in subsection (2)(b) may be inferred from the
conduct of any relevant person or from any other relevant circumstance.
Applicants would need to establish — the onus, of course, falls upon them to
make out the exemption—75 that their behaviour is a ‘collaborative activity’.
First, the parties need to be undertaking an enterprise or venture, in trade, ‘in
cooperation’ with each other. This, explains the Commerce Commission in its
Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, requires the parties to be combining
their businesses in such a way that it can, as a matter of ‘substance’ (and not
just form) be said that they are working jointly towards the same end.76 So an
agreement between the firms about how to run their separate operations would
not possess the requisite quality of cooperative activity to constitute a
‘collaborative’ activity.77
Second, joint activity must not be engaged in for the ‘dominant’ purpose of
lessening competition between them. This may or may not be an easy task to
ascertain. There is no statutory definition of ‘dominant’ but the commission
suggest that the ordinary meaning will pertain, that is, that dominant means
‘prevailing’ and ‘most influential’.78 Given that purpose can be inferred from
conduct (s 31(3)) the applicants must hope that the tribunal view the purpose
as benignly as the parties do. Notice that the threshold here is lower: the
reduction of competition referred to in s 31(2)(b) need not be a ‘substantial’
lessening of competition (as the principal prohibition, s 27, requires), but
simply a lessening.79 Anything more than a de minimis amount would
presumably suffice.
The parties must then establish that their cartel conduct is ‘reasonably
necessary’ for the success of the collaborative venture. The commission point
75 Ibid, at [5.2].
76 Ibid, at [5.4].
77 Ibid at [5.13].
78 Ibid, at [5.16].
79 Ibid, at n 60.
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out that this is lower threshold than ‘essential’, so that is advantageous to
applicants.80 But quite what threshold it represents remains to be seen. In its
guidelines the commission state that the phrase means something more than
‘merely desirable, expedient or preferable’.81 In determining this, the analysis
may get quite complex. The commission will consider what other ‘practically
workable alternatives’ (in contrast to ‘theoretical or extravagant possibilities’)
are open to the applicants to achieve their collaborative goals other than the
conduct in question.82 This analysis, in turn, will see the commission asking
a series of searching questions such as why the parties included the cartel
provision in the first place and whether its scope (including its duration,
geographic reach, relationship to the parties’ business and so on) is greater
than necessary to achieve the parties’ collaborative objective.83
The s 31 exemption for collaborative activity is an exemption from the per
se ban in s 30. The arrangement may still be unlawful if it has the purpose,
effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a market.84
Turning to the novel clearance mechanism for anti-competitive
arrangements (prior to this, clearances were only available for mergers and
acquisitions), s 65A states, in relevant part:
65A. Commission may give clearances relating to cartel provisions
(1) A person who proposes to enter into a contract or arrangement, or arrive
at an understanding, that contains, or may contain, a cartel provision may
apply to the Commission for a clearance under this section.
(2) The Commission must give a clearance under this section if it is satisfied
that—
(a) the applicant and any other party to the proposed contract,
arrangement, or understanding are or will be involved in a
collaborative activity; and
(b) every cartel provision in the contract, arrangement, or understanding
is reasonably necessary for the purpose of the collaborative activity;
and
(c) entering into the contract or arrangement, or arriving at the
understanding, or giving effect to any provision of the contract,
arrangement, or understanding, will not have, or would not be likely
to have, the effect of substantially lessening competition in a market.
This provision, unsurprisingly, mirrors s 31. There are, none the less, two
differences. The reference to the ‘dominant purpose’ has been omitted. Indeed,
there is no reference to purpose at all. Instead, the clearance will be given only
if the arrangement does not have the effect or likely effect of substantially
lessening competition in a market. Second, as just noted, the lessening of
competition must be ‘substantial’. Once more the same interpretive minefield
(to that facing them in the collaborative activity exemption route) awaits
parties seeking to gain a clearance.
80 Ibid, at [5.31].
81 Ibid, at [5.33].
82 Ibid, at [5.34].
83 Ibid, at [5.35]-[5.38].
84 Ibid, at [2.6].
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The commission have 30 working days to consider the clearance
application, with failure to give consent deemed to be a denial of clearance.85
Applicants can apply to keep the fact of their clearance application
confidential, although it is ‘highly unlikely’ requests for confidentiality will be
to be granted if the application proceeds to stage 2, the assessment of the
anti-competitive effects of the arrangement.86 Clearance applications are
recorded on the Clearance Register in the commission’s website and decisions
to decline or give clearance similarly noted, together with the issuance of a
media release.
The dearth of cases is not a sign that the ban is ineffective
It is expensive to bring antitrust cases. The public enforcement body, the
Commerce Commission, has responsibility for consumer protection (the Fair
Trading Act 1986, the Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act 2003), a
raft of specialist regulatory regimes (the Telecommunications Act 2001, the
Dairy Industry Restructuring Act 2001, electricity line services and so on) as
well as the Commerce Act 1986, and its scarce resources are necessarily
marshalled carefully.
An example of a case that never got to a full hearing, but was none the less
a widely reported happening in the business world was the Petrocorp dispute
with New Zealand Refining in 1988. Petrocorp Exploration Ltd complained of
being shut out from New Zealand’s sole oil refinery at Marsden Point, a
facility operated by the defendant, from 1988-91.87 Petrocorp produced a large
quantity of crude oil and condensate that needed to be refined. It complained
it was not able to enter the market for the wholesale distribution of petrol
because of an arrangement entered into by the defendant and the so-called ‘big
four’ petroleum companies (BP, Shell, Caltex and Mobil) in 1988. Petrocorp
held a 13.4% shareholding in the refinery, with around two-thirds owned by
the big four and the balance held by the public.
Section 29 was pleaded as a cause of action along with ss 27 and 36.88
Petrocorp’s original claim filed in the Whangarei High Court in 1990 was for
$91.6 million in compensatory damages and was later increased to $127
million.89 Meanwhile, the Minister of Energy, John Luxton, had been called
upon to intervene and help resolve the parties’ differences. He declined.90 In
March 1993, the parties announced a settlement.91 This deal did not enable
Petrocorp to access the Marsden Point refinery.
85 Section 65A (4). The commission’s guidance of the process for clearances is set out in some
detail in the Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, Ch 7.
86 CCG, above n 74, at [7.13].
87 P Smellie, ‘Petrol firm row sparks $90m writ’, The [Christchurch] Press, 26 October 1991,
p 1.
88 Details of the dispute are largely confined to contemporaneous newspaper reports, although
a confirmatory account can be found in the (successful) application by the defendant for
further and better particulars of the statement of claim in Petrocorp Exploration Ltd v New
Zealand Refining Co Ltd (1993) 7 PRNZ 53.
89 D McEwen, ‘Petrocorp boost claim to $127m against oil refinery company’, National
Business Review, 11 September 1992, p 3.
90 C Howie, ‘Luxton holds out hope for Petrocorp’, Dominion, 16 April 1992, p 11.
91 ‘$127m refinery dispute settled, but companies tight-lipped’, Otago Daily Times, 24 March
1993, p 15.
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Here then we have a case that never got to court, but none the less achieved
sufficient notoriety in the commercial press to signal that anticompetitive
conduct in the nature of boycotting was impermissible.
In 1996 the High Court would have imposed a pecuniary penalty upon the
Rotorua Branch of the Motel Association of New Zealand. Moteliers in that
city had expelled two members, Kiwi Lodge and Bel Aire Motel, for not
removing their billboards from the footpath, billboards that advertised reduced
rates. The branch agreed it had contravened s 29. But before the court could
enter judgment, the branch was conveniently dissolved. Robertson J expressed
concern at the timing of the disbandment of the defendant, adding:
my unease was increased when I learned that an overwhelming majority of its
members had reorganised themselves into some new body.92
Although imposition of any pecuniary penalty was now rendered futile, he
issued a declaration that the Commerce Act had been breached. The
Commerce Commission was satisfied with the remedy of a declaration,
‘content that it [had] achieved at least the educative purposes of this
exercise’.93 The court warned the moteliers that any future infringements of
this kind would attract a substantially greater penalty than the modest $15,000
suggested during the hearing.
The Commerce Commission promptly issued a media release announcing
that the High Court had sent a warning to trade and professional associations
not to engage in anticompetitive boycotting behaviour of this kind.94
Conclusion
Group boycotts, or at least the direct suppression of them, seems to have
reached a nadir. Interestingly, the comprehensive review of Australian
competition law and policy95 has recommended that s 45(2)(a)(i) (combined
with s 4D), its counterpart prohibition to New Zealand’s s 29, be abolished.
The Harper Panel in its draft report did not spend long on the issue, but did
reach the view that:
the prohibition of exclusionary provisions, separately from cartel conduct, is
unnecessary and increases the complexity of the law. The definition of exclusionary
provisions overlaps substantially with the definition of market sharing, a form of
cartel conduct. The Panel recommends that the separate prohibition of exclusionary
provisions be removed from the CCA [Competition and Consumer Act 2010
(Cth)].96
Harmonisation of Australasian competition law is desirable, but not, I would
suggest, if this involves replicating a mistake on each side of the Tasman.
92 Commerce Commission v Rotorua Branch of the Motel Assoc of New Zealand Unreported,
HC Rotorua, CP 7/95, 23 August 1996, Robertson J, at 3.
93 Ibid, at 4.
94 ‘High Court warning to trade and professional association’, Commerce Commission Media
Release, 23 August 1996, at <http://www.comcom.govt.nz/the-commission/media-
centre/media-releases/detail/1996/highcourtwarningtot> (accessed 5 August 2015).
95 Australian Government, Competition Policy Review: Draft Report, September 2014, (Harper
Draft Report, at <http://competitionpolicyreview.gov.au/draft-report/> (accessed 5 August
2015). The Review Panel is headed by Prof Ian Harper. See further S Corones, ‘Competition
Policy Review: Draft recommendations on competition laws’ (2014) 42 ABLR 479.
96 Harper Draft Report, above n 95, p 222.
98 (2015) 23 Competition & Consumer Law Journal
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Those who propose a change in the law bear the burden of justifying it. The
notion that the group boycott proscription is simply parasitic upon a broader
per se ban upon cartels is fashionable,97 but I believe it is misconceived. There
is not, in my view, a convincing case in favour of repealing s 29. First, the
paucity of litigated cases and authorisation determinations does not tell the
whole story. For we may never know the actual hortatory effect98 of the s 29
per se rule. The group boycott ban may have quietly been serving its purpose
of deterring anticompetitive and socially abhorrent exclusionary behaviour
without this ever registering publicly in the form of statements of claim or
applications for immunisation. The statement by Russell McVeagh that
business concerns with s 29 came to its attention on ‘almost a weekly basis’99
is a double-edged one. For while it might demonstrate the irksome intrusion
of s 29, it might equally indicate that the section was doing its job. Potentially
anticompetitive behaviour was being halted or restructured into another less
deleterious form because of s 29.
Second, the suggested replacements for s 29 do not cover the same ground.
Section 27, the general prohibition upon anticompetitive conduct, is a much
more difficult weapon to use against alleged boycotting conduct. It is less
effective than s 29. By contrast, the revamped per se ban upon cartels in s 30
may be overly broad, in that it may sweep in boycotts that were never caught
by s 29. There are novel exemptions for cartel conduct in ss 31 and 65A, but
these will by no means be easy to satisfy. If I am correct, then this is, indeed,
ironic, as the refashioned cartel offence was meant to be the replacement for
s 29: a prohibition that was thought to chill healthy business activity is now
replaced by one with a potentially greater reach and capacity to deter
commercial conduct.
Broad arguments from liberty that we should err on the side of
non-intervention do not take us far, any more than cries from the business
community that they find the section bothersome. It is the purpose of antitrust
law to be ‘bothersome’ and to challenge ‘cosy’, ‘orderly’ anticompetitive
practices that might otherwise continue unabated.100 The government’s
solicitude for the views of the business community is understandable, yet is (at
best) but half the story. For the Commerce Act 1986 is designed ‘to promote
competition in markets for the long-term benefit of consumers within New
Zealand’101 — not the interests of the business community alone.
97 An antitrust heavyweight, Judge Posner, takes this view: ‘To treat boycotts as a substantive
antitrust practice comparable to tying, collusive pricing, vertical integration, and the others
would be to make what philosophers call a category mistake. A boycott is simply a method
of self-help enforcement. It can be used by firms to enforce a cartel, in which event it is bad
because cartels are bad’. ‘Boycotts are properly attacked under the antitrust laws only when
they are used to enforce a practice that offends substantive antitrust policy’. R A Posner,
Antitrust Law, 2nd ed, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2001, pp 238 and 241.
98 The ‘hortatory’ function of law is its channelling or signalling role, achieved by legal and
judicial ‘incentives and disincentives ... to encourage behaviour of a positive or affirmative
character’: P Atiyah, ‘From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the
Judicial Process and the Law’ (1980) 65 Iowa L Rev 1249 at 1249.
99 Commerce Committee Report on the Commerce Amendment Bill, 1 February 2001, p 10.
100 See Kirby J (dissenting) in Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (2001) 205
CLR 1; 178 ALR 253; [2001] HCA 13; BC200100872 at [84], [96] and [122].
101 See s 1A.
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Sometimes it is as well to just leave things alone. The repeal of s 29 is
regrettable.
Appendix
100 (2015) 23 Competition & Consumer Law Journal
